InsIght B13tuesday 22 june 2021
The Company of Master Mariners of 
Sri Lanka (CMM) is a member of the 
Organisation of Professional 
Associations of Sri Lanka (OPA). 
Having conducted a webinar on the 
subject, wishes to enlighten the 
general public on the numerous 
aspects of shipboard operations in 
general and required preparedness 
towards possible maritime 
emergencies in our waters such as the 
incident of MV X-Press Pearl.
With a membership of over 300 ship 
captains, some employed on ships, 
both local and foreign,  and some in 
the shore-based shipping industry, 
both in Government organisations 
and the private sector, the wealth of 
professional knowledge, skills and the 
experience of members instrumented 
the CMM to join the OPA to conduct a 
webinar on the subject of MV 
X-PRESS PEARL DISASTER – in the 
backdrop of the X-Press Pearl debacle 
and, present an unbiased professional 
view on the matter when so many 
versions with inaccuracies, some very 
blatant unfortunately, were circulated 
widely.      
In the case of the X-Press Pearl, the 
following are the facts of the vessel 
and her voyage in question i.e.
• X Press Pearl is a three-month-old 
ship 186 m in length and 34.8 m in 
breadth and 17.9 m in depth with 
37,000 MT carrying capacity and 
ability to accommodate 2,700 TEUs.  
• Vessel operated by X-Press 
Feeders of Sea Consortium Group and 
was employed in a regular service 
connecting Singapore, Jebel Ali 
(United Arab Emirates), Port Hamad 
(Qatar) , Hazira ( Gujarat ,India)  
Colombo ,  Port Kelang and Tanjung 
Pelapas (Malaysia), on an 
approximately 30-day round voyage, 
• This was the third time the 
X-Press Pearl called Colombo Port in 
her short life of three months. 
• The ship’s crew had noticed a leak 
from a container after leaving Jebel 
Ali in UAE for Port Hamad in Qatar. It 
was identified to contain Nitric Acid.
• In Hamad, Qatar, the Ship’s 
Captain had requested the port to 
arrange the discharge of the container 
which had been refused owing to 
unavailability of resources.
• Port of Hazira, another port in 
Gujarat, India, refused to discharge 
the said container for reasons 
unknown. Perhaps due to insufficient 
time.     
• Finally, she arrived in Sri Lanka, 
Colombo anchorage as the next 
scheduled port and not as ‘a port of 
refuge’.
What happened thereafter is widely 
publicised but with numerous 
speculations. Let us explain the 
standard practices. 
When a vessel calls a scheduled 
port of call on her regular service, she 
would comply with normal port entry 
formalities which includes notice of 
arrival, International Ships and Ports 
Security (ISPS) Clearance – a 
responsibility delegated to the Navy in 
Sri Lanka, declaration of cargoes, 
stores (items for ship’s use), and crew 
effects. As for cargo, there could be 
much more detailed information 
declared by the ship’s operator, 
48-hours before arrival when 
possible, through electronic means or 
through the local agent, including a 
declaration of dangerous goods. 
Having complied with such formalities 
and, agents having attended to 
required advance payments to Port 
Authority and/or to the applicable 
container terminal where the vessel 
would be berthed, she would be listed 
in the schedule of berthing. On arrival 
in the vicinity of the port, the vessel 
would be either berthed directly if the 
scheduled berth is available or 
instructed to anchor at a designated 
anchorage outside the harbour, 
awaiting the berth.    
It must be pointed out that carriage 
of dangerous cargo onboard ships is a 
very common occurrence. Identifying 
the dangers involved in the process, 
the entire membership of states of the 
International Maritime Organisation 
(IMO), the body of the UN on maritime 
matters, has agreed to adopt and 
comply with a set of mandatory 
requirements named the IMDG Code 
(International Maritime Dangerous 
Goods Code) which deals with all the 
dangerous cargoes carried on ships in 
packaged form the world over. They 
are listed by their UN numbers and 
categorised into nine different classes 
namely explosives, gases, 
compressed, liquefied or dissolved 
under pressure, flammable liquids, 
flammable solids or substances, 
oxidizing substances (agents) and 
organic peroxides, toxic and infectious 
substances, radioactive substances, 
corrosives and miscellaneous 
dangerous substances and articles, 
and describes the methods of packing, 
labelling, segregation and emergency 
procedures in case of fire or spill.
No country can handle dangerous 
cargo in packaged form without 
adhering to the said IMDG Code. The 
responsibility of shippers is to ensure 
that the cargo is correctly packed, 
labelled, separated and segregated 
from possible contaminants or 
reactors as described in the Code. The 
smaller, individual packages of cargo 
are then packed into containers, if to 
be shipped by container ships. If a 
container is loaded with dangerous 
cargo, what other cargoes can be 
carried in the same shipping 
container is described in the Code and 
to be strictly complied with. 
Thereafter, how different shipping 
containers with dangerous cargoes 
can be loaded on to a vessel with 
proper segregation etc. as described 
in the Code is to be adhered to and 
pre-planned by the cargo planners of 
the shipping line or on behalf of the 
shipping line by a competent party 
like the terminal operators. What 
dangerous cargoes can be carried 
together in the same hold,  what must 
be carried in separate holds or what 
cannot be carried even in adjacent 
holds, what has to be carried on deck, 
or what cargoes cannot be carried 
unless special safety and pollution 
prevention arrangements are available 
on the vessel, etc. are all described in 
the IMDG Code. The compliance with 
the provisions of the IMDG Code is to 
be ensured by the ship’s Master 
before loading any dangerous cargoes 
on the ship.
Naration of the incident
In the case of the X-Press Pearl, 
with a leaking Nitric Acid container, it 
seems that the Master of the ship has 
acted prudently in reaching out for 
shore assistance from the subsequent 
ports of call when there was still no 
fire on board. Then, the following 
events unfolded in Colombo. 
On arrival Colombo on 19 May 
midnight or in the early hours of 20 
May, the vessel had been asked to 
drop anchor North West of Colombo 
harbour as her scheduled berth at the 
Colombo International Container 
Terminal (CICT) was not available 
until the late evening of 20 May. 
During that stay at anchor, on 20 May 
morning, the local agent of the vessel 
supposed to have informed the Port 
Control of Colombo by email that 
there is a leaky Nitric Acid container 
onboard which needed reworking on 
berthing. About the same time the 
Master of the vessel also supposed to 
have informed the Port Control by 
VHF about the leaky container on 
deck which was then emanating some 
fumes which need to be removed on 
berthing.  Subsequently, the Master 
had also reported a fire on board 
which the ship’s crew managed to 
have contained by using the ship’s 
fixed firefighting system containing 
Carbon Dioxide. On 20 May 
afternoon, SLPA and Navy, in 
consultation with other relevant 
agencies had sent a team to inspect 
the situation on board the vessel in 
order to decide the next course of 
action. 
After inspecting, they might have 
reported their findings to the relevant 
officials which do not seem to have 
warranted urgent action. 
By late evening on the same day, 
the ship had again reported a fire 
onboard and requested assistance 
upon which the Ports Authority and 
SL Navy dispatched the fire-fighting 
tug and some other vessels which 
apparently managed to contain the 
fire in about two hours. However, they 
continued with the boundary-cooling. 
The material used to fight the fire and 
for boundary-cooling had been 
seawater. 
The wind had been very strong and 
the sea very rough by this time. In the 
prevalent weather, because the 
effectiveness of the firefighting tug 
was insufficient, SLPA deployed two 
more tugs to assist with the 
boundary-cooling. Unfortunately, by 
21 May, the fire had reignited and 
started to spread rapidly, probably 
due to the very strong winds. On 22 
May evening, a specialized tug 
operated by the salvage company that 
was appointed by the vessel owner 
also arrived on the scene and engaged 
in firefighting. On the 24 May, 
extremely strong winds that prevailed 
by then had rendered the fight against 
the fire an impossible task. On the 25 
May morning, explosions of some 
containers had taken place and the 
ship’s crew and some members of the 
salvage party who were onboard at 
that time had to be evacuated. 
In the next few days, the fire 
engulfed the entire ship, destroying 
practically all containers on deck and 
the accommodation too. The heat 
emanated by the fire and the 
explosions that happened on board 
may have impacted the structural 
integrity of the vessel. From the entire 
account of events in chronological 
order, there are numerous 
unanswered questions. Before we look 
at them, let us see another incident 
that took place in April 2017.
Msc daniela
‘MSC Daniela’ was a larger 
container vessel of 366 m length, 51 
m width, 162,867 tonne capacity, 
with an ability to load 14,000 twenty-
foot equivalent units (TEUs) of 
containers operated by the 
Mediterranean Shipping Company. 
She was on her way from the Far East 
to Europe. She had a container fire 
onboard whilst she was 120 nautical 
miles away from Colombo.   Upon 
receiving a distress message from the 
vessel by Sri Lanka’s Maritime Rescue 
Coordinating Centre (MRCC) operated 
by the Sri Lanka Navy, assistance was 
provided by the Sri Lanka Ports 
Authority, Sri Lanka Navy, the Indian 
Coast Guard, along with a private tug 
operator arranged by the vessel’s Sri 
Lankan agent. The Marine 
Environment Protection Authority 
(MEPA) was also involved in the 
operation. The fire fighting continued 
for 10 days in the open seas and the 
vessel was brought to Colombo whilst 
the fire was still not doused 
completely. Fire-fighting continued 
even at the berth as some of the 
damaged containers were removed. 
Finally, the fire was doused 
successfully, all containers including 
the ones that were damaged by the 
fire were unloaded, and the vessel 
sent to China for repairs. In this 
incident, Sri Lanka’s professionalism 
and skilful handling as a regional hub 
port operator was praised by the 
shipping and the maritime 
community the world over.     
X-Press Pearl 
The X-Press Pearl on the other 
hand, arrived in Colombo on a 
scheduled port call, with no fire 
reported but only with a leaky Nitric 
Acid container on deck that was 
emanating brown or yellow fumes, but 
ended up in a major disaster, finally. 
Following are some questions that 
are being asked about this incident:
1. Why didn’t the ship owning 
company take immediate steps to 
arrange to discharge the leaking 
container even by sailing back to the 
load port or at next two subsequent 
ports?
2. Did the Master evaluate the 
situation even to refuse sailing 
without discharging the leaking 
container considering it a serious 
enough situation that would impact 
the safety of crew and the vessel?
3. Did the Local agent in Colombo 
request the Port of Colombo for urgent 
berthing on arrival to arrange the 
discharging of the leaking container?
4. Was there a chance for the Ports 
Authority to berth the vessel on 
arrival Colombo on priority basis and 
discharge the leaking container at any 
other berth other than the scheduled 
berth?
5. Did inspection team led by SLPA 
evaluate the position on board upon 
their boarding the vessel at anchorage 
to determine the urgently needed 
action, especially with the CO2 
system being completely exhausted by 
then?
6. Does Sri Lanka have a system 
and mechanism in place to quickly 
assess the risks involved in maritime 
emergencies on ships that call our 
ports or coastal waters? 
7. Does Sri Lanka have ready at 
hand an emergency plan, expertise 
and resources for an emergency of 
this scale?
8. Does Sri Lanka have in place 
necessary laws and regulatory 
structures to execute international 
Conventions and Resolutions in 
dealing with Maritime matters under 
one Responsible Authority and 
delegating duties to other responsible 
institutions in case of emergencies?
Answers to these questions need a 
holistic understanding of situations, 
taking into account the practicalities 
or limitations, resource availability, 
and other risks involved in handling 
such situations.   
Recommendations
However, it is our opinion that the 
following areas need immediate 
attention and actions following the 
lessons learnt from both recent 
incidents – MT New Diamond and MV 
X-Press Pearl and the successful 
handling of MSC Daniela. 
n The Minister in Charge to initiate 
and establish a ‘Maritime Emergency 
Responsible Authority’ under the 
existing or re-enacted Merchant 
Shipping Act to deal with Maritime 
Emergencies.
n Revamp the Merchant Shipping 
act to make the Director General of 
Merchant Shipping and its Secretariat 
to be sole correspondent 
(representative) of the IMO for 
Maritime Matters on board ships with 
the jurisdiction of all waters around 
the country to be the sole responsible 
authority to execute the 
internationally agreed conventions 
and resolutions and to be the local 
responsible party to intervene.
n The Minister to ensure all such 
international conventions, resolutions 
agreed are brought to the legislature 
of the country and relevant 
regulations are gazetted
n Especially become a party to 
important IMO conventions like the 
Salvage Convention, Wreck Removal 
Convention, Bunker Convention and 
Search and Rescue Convention, 
Hazards and Noxious Substances 
Convention as soon as possible and 
have domestic legislations accordingly
n Under the revised Merchant 
Shipping Act so empowered, define 
the roles of the other agencies in any 
applicable Maritime affair and 
delegate such duties to ; Ports 
Authority, SL Navy, Marine 
Environment Protection Authority 
(MEPA), SL Coastguard, National 
Aquatic Resource Agency (NARA), 
Telecommunication Regulatory 
Commission,  Sri Lanka Customs, 
and Immigration etc. 
n Identify and document the 
emergency response roles of other 
agencies such as the Sri Lanka Air 
Force, the Air Port Authority, other 
local authorities, and the relevant 
private sector organizations, like 
Colombo Dockyard and Salvage and 
Towage Companies, Local service 
vessel operators and other service 
providers and suppliers etc
n Have an effective Emergency 
Response Plan and conduct frequent 
drills
n Maintain appropriate and 
sufficient resources, assets, 
equipment and facilities for 
emergencies. In that regard, 
encourage private sector to have 
suitably trained emergency response 
and salvage teams and equipment 
that can be enlisted by the said 
Authority in an emergency because, 
maintaining such resources by the 
Government alone will not be 
economical.
n Have mechanisms for immediate 
mobilization of those resources and 
services in an emergency including 
the reward mechanism to follow 
naturally.
n Have a responsible communication 
mechanism to coordinate the 
dissemination of appropriate and 
accurate information as required. 
Finally, it is paramount to enhance 
the reputation of the country as a 
capable maritime nation which in 
turn helps the Sri Lanka as a nation.
Company of Master Mariners Of 
Sri Lanka 
As Member of OPA (Organization 
of Professional Associations of Sri 
Lanka) 
Company of Master Mariners and OPA Explain
Maritime Operations, 
Perils at Sea with X-Press 
Pearl as a Case Study
Sri Lankan Security Personnel remove debris from the X-Press Pearl ship, on a beach 
at Pamunugama in Negombo, Sri Lanka, on 27 May, 2021. The Sri Lanka Navy on 
Thursday said it was extinguishing the flames on board the X-Press Pearl ship which 
caught fire near the Colombo Port on 20 May. Visuals released by local media showed 
that beaches extending from Colombo to Negombo on the west coast, had been pollut-
ed from debris from the burning ship and the Police had warned people not to touch it 
as it may be harmful (Pic by Gayan Sameera/Xinhua)